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CIVIL SOCIETY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: 
BETWEEN THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALISATION 
AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALISATION 
This essay offers an analysis of arguments by Ernest Gellner, Jeno Szucz and George Shopflin. 
Considering civil society as a historical phenomenon, these authors attempt to clarify its essence by 
tracing the emergence of civil society in Western Europe, and then by employing comparative method, 
to explain its 'weakness' (or even its failure 'to emerge') in East Central Europe. The essay questions 
the efficiency of this type of analysis for understanding the phenomenon of civil society. It argues that 
the inefficiency of macro- and meso-scale analysis of civil society calls for a micro-scale reconsider­
ation and a greater historical contextualisation of sociological and theoretical enquiries, and for a 
more informed dialogue between history and theory of civil society. 
The problem addressed in this essay, is that of 
the appropriate 'scale' of analysis relating to the 
concept of civil society as a social phenomenon. 
In its most general form, the definition of civil 
society relates to: an area of non-prescriptive social 
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actions and relationships; the social space located 
between the prescriptions imposed by the state, and 
those imposed by kin and kin networks, and 
between the formal institutions of the state and the 
individual. Its existence is closely associated with 
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liberalism — the limited state, the rule of law and a 
market economy associated with private proper­
ty — and strong associational culture [1]. The other 
aspect of such linkage is the identification of civil 
society as a prerequisite for stable democracy [2] 
that denotes the prescriptive, nominal aspect of the 
concept, as an ideal of how society should work in 
order to be liberal and democratic [3]. Many 
authors also tend to assume that civil society is a 
historical phenomenon, which is not universal, but 
a product of European (or to be precise, western 
European) history (however, with no unilateral 
agreement as to when it was indeed "civil") [4]. In 
the latter case, one can justifiably question the flex­
ibility of the analytical concept which is construct­
ed on the basis of or derived out of certain histori­
cal reality, and the validity of this concept for 
describing or analysing social phenomena in other 
historical and geographical settings. 
These multiple meanings attached to the notion 
of civil society can partly be explained by the very 
circumstances of its resurrection from a predomi­
nantly late eighteenth — mid-nineteenth century 
political philosophy [5], which brought it back to 
the core of scholarly disputes. Among them were 
the concern with the quality of social life, the de­
cline of civic activity and the debate on the role of 
welfare state in the West, and social and political 
transformations in the other parts of the world, in 
particular East Central Europe. Here the crisis of 
"real socialism" as an experience and ideology, 
motivated the search for the conceptual alternative 
to the type of social order produced under the 
Soviet party-system which was identified with the 
idea of civil society. 
Similar incentives have also inspired scholarly 
searches for the historical roots of civil society, and 
the origins of its 'weakness' or 'absence' in East 
Central Europe that presumably made this region a 
favourable ground for the emergence of 'totalitari­
an' or 'Soviet-type' regimes after the Second World 
War. 
This essay offers an analysis of arguments by 
Ernest Gellner, Jeno Sziicz and George Shopflin. 
Considering civil society as a historical phenome­
non, these authors attempt to clarify its essence by 
tracing the emergence of civil society in Western 
Europe, and then by employing comparative 
method, to explain its 'weakness' (or even its 'fail­
ure 'to emerge') in East Central Europe. The pur­
pose of this essay is to assess the efficiency of this 
type of analysis for use in understanding the phe­
nomenon of civil society. 
Ernest Gellner's Conditions of Liberty. Civil 
Society and Its Rivals, is often referred to as an 
influential philosophical and sociological account 
of civil society in an historical context. The very 
nature of the work that brings together the analyti­
cal concept and the empirical evidence and identi­
fies the normative appeal of the concept, makes its 
comprehensive interpretation complicated. There­
fore only those points, which seem essential and 
most relevant for the purposes of this essay, will be 
selected and included. 
Gellner initially characterises civil society as 
something that existed in the liberal states of the 
northern Atlantic society since at least 1945, and as 
something non-existent and therefore acutely 
aspired to in East European societies, which were 
until recently characterised by a single political-
economic-ideological hierarchy, 'high centralisa­
tion of all aspects of life', and 'compiled of atom­
ised individuals' [6]. 
Moreover, Gellner identifies the essential fea­
tures of civil society in Western Europe in compar­
ison with its historical predecessors (pluralist, non-
centralised, but socially oppressive, traditional 
agrarian societies, and authoritarian centralised 
monarchies) and "ideal typical" rivals (so-called 
Muslim and Marxist "ideocracies" with atomised 
societies and all-empowered state). Finally, he 
traces the historical origins and preconditions for 
civil society. 
In the course of this analysis Gellner shows a 
double — analytical and normative — function of 
the notion. 
Thus, from an analytical point of view, civil 
society presents a distinct form of social organisa­
tion based on the separation of economic and social 
spheres from the political, with pluralism placed in 
the political sphere, thus preventing the domination 
of the state. The state establishes limits relating to 
'extremes of individual interests' in economic 
spheres, and pluralism in autonomous economic 
sphere provides the check to the activities of the 
state [7]. 
At the same time, the notion of civil society 
helps in clarifying social norms. In Gellner's view, 
it is markedly superior to the notion of 'democra­
cy', which does not include and explain the social 
pre-conditions of the effectiveness of general con­
sent and participation, specific states of mind, or the 
social organisation or external circumstances under 
which this form operates [8]. Civil society is a more 
realistic notion as it specifies and includes its own 
preconditions [9]. 
Civil society can only emerge in the conditions 
of steady economic growth and intellectual or ideo­
logical pluralism. These conditions are closely 
interrelated [10]. Sustained economic growth relies 
on the progress of science "which is incompatible 
with a cognitive picture of the world, which is 
socially sustained, enforced and endowed with a 
priori authority" [11]. Yet another demand of eco-
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nomic growth is a generic education, which pre­
pares the individual for different specialities. This 
in turn leads to growing cultural homogeneity and 
egalitarianism, thereby producing "a secular, free-
choosing individual, unhampered by social or theo­
logical bonds and able of reaching some agreement 
concerning social order with his fellows" [12]. 
Thus, Gellner identifies cultural homogeneity 
and individualistic rational ethos as pre-conditions 
and functional requirements of civil society. 
However, he admits that neither civil society as a 
form of social organisation nor its cultural and eco­
nomic pre-conditions constitute an inherent attrib­
ute of the human condition. Therefore he attempts 
an inquiry into their historical roots. 
Ancient cities gave origins to participatory 
democracy — the non-centralised and plural rale. 
Yet, they were socially oppressive, as they ascribe 
the individual his identity (as a member of a family 
clan and religious community) [13]. The so-called 
absolutist (effective and centralised) state that did 
not atomise the rest of society, with its respect for 
law and property, had already prepared the ground 
for the civil society which was completed by the 
modern democratic state [14]. 
Gellner gives special attention to the role of 
Christianity — the Christian idea of separation of 
religion and polity that made individual liberty 
thinkable [15] and the contribution of Protestantism 
to establishing the ethos of civil society. This ethos' 
origins can be traced back to the birth of the prac­
tice of toleration, at the end of the religious wars in 
post-Reformation Europe. Firstly, political defeat of 
Protestants caused the routinisation and diminution 
of their "religious enthusiasm", based on concern 
with personal salvation. As a result, they were 
pushed to exercise it in economic activity. This in 
turn made them acceptable to the power holder, and 
they engendered "that work ethic and sustained 
accumulation which produced modern economy". 
The toleration found in the political and economic 
sphere laid foundations for economic growth [16]. 
Secondly, Protestantism "laid on each individual 
the enormous burden of being his own priest and 
internal judge. Whether this ethos engendered or 
followed an economy increasingly oriented towards 
individualism is a much discussed question" (italics 
added — О. K.). Concern with virtue "led a man to 
a disinterested pursuit of interest" and "individual 
commitment to contract not status", thus producing 
individualistic, self-policing, modular ethos of civil 
society [17]. 
This historical conjuncture was further accom­
plished with a commercial revolution that initiated 
economic growth, and in due course was comple­
mented by industrial and scientific revolutions that 
made that growth permanent and stable [18]. 
Thus, civil society emerged first among the 
Protestant "nations of shopkeepers" — the Dutch 
and the English — when their ".. .internal organisa­
tion and ethos had shifted away to production and a 
measure of intellectual liberty and genuine 
exploitation of nature, became richer, organised in 
relatively liberal polities and more effective milita­
rily than the societies based on and practising the 
old marital values, and dominated by aristocracies" 
[19]. For Gellner, their example demonstrated that 
booming economic activity is a better path to 
wealth than domination and made civil socier a 
pattern to be followed by other European nations. I: 
also gave birth to the notion of "underdevelopment" 
among the intellectuals of those countries that were 
willing to 'catch up' with their northern neighbours 
and to search for theoretical solutions to this goal. 
One of such solutions, 'the Enlightenment proj­
ect', resulted in French revolution and its subse 
quent terrors, as it ignored 'constraints inherent in 
the very nature of social order'. This message was, 
however, disregarded by the Marxist project, which 
culminated in the Russian revolutions. It demanded 
total mobilisation and subjection of society to the 
ideocratic state, leading ultimately to atomisation of 
society. This project collapsed on the basis of an 
unsatisfactory economic performance, which was 
hardly comparable to that experienced in the West 
[20]. 
The 'normal' path of establishing the civil soci­
ety in other parts of Europe (their "Westernisation" 
or "liberalisation"), as described by Gellner, 
occurred in a 'diffusionist' mode and roughly des­
cribed, proceeded as follows [21]. 
The industrialisation of societies led to 
homogenisation of culture (as a functional demand 
of occupational mobility) within certain political 
units, and consequently to nationalism as a demand 
for congruency of the boundaries of man's own cul­
ture, and the boundaries of the political units he 
lives within. This occurred in successive stages 
Their description here is unnecessary; though para­
doxically enough, they correspond not to economic 
development (as the model suggests) but to political 
events — wars and revolutions — through which 
different European "time zones" pass with a certain 
time lag. The main point is that on the threshold of 
the First World War the main obstacle to the emer­
gence of civil society in the third time zone, East 
Central Europe (roughly corresponding to the 
European territories of former Habsburg and 
Ottoman empires), was ethnic nationalism. 
Gellner asserts that ethnic nationalism emerges 
here because of region's multinational composition 
and non-congruence of cultural and political bound­
aries. However, numerous ethnic minorities inhab­
iting smaller political units that emerged after the 
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collapse of these empires were either expelled, or 
assimilated or even exterminated — partly due to 
Hitlerist and Stalinist policies. This led to greater 
cultural homogenisation of the region making it 
more "prepared" for the emergence of civil society 
after a delay caused by its temporary submission to 
the Soviet rule after the Second World War. The 
last, fourth zone — Eastern Europe (former Russian 
empire) — would probably have followed the same 
pattern of development if it was not temporarily 
"frozen" by the earlier establishment of the Soviet 
regime. Therefore, following Gellner's logic, after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, here the task of 
bringing into being the economic and political 
aspects of civil society, makes mandatory the 
strength of ethnic feelings and nationalist rivalry, 
with subsequent ethnic cleansing leading to 
homogenisation of culture, within recently estab­
lished political units. Thus nationalism presents a 
major threat to the emergence of civil society in 
Eastern Europe. At the same time, in the first, 
Westernmost zone of Europe, as a result of "indus­
trialism", the intensity of ethnic feelings diminished 
proving the Tightness of the "convergence thesis", 
in that industrial cultures eventually come to resem­
ble each other. Finally, Gellner predicts a similar 
path of development for Europe in its entirety — 
the degree of cultural affinity will grow [22]. 
Thereby the coming of civil society to Eastern 
Europe is presented as being possible after a period 
of time — as an outcome of sustainable economic 
growth, if only the rise of nationalism does not 
halt it. 
Consequently, Gellner turns to "historicist" 
optimism by proclaiming the sustainability and dif­
fusion of civil society as an "irreversible verdict of 
history". Although he admits that it "may or may 
not be (italics added — О. K.) the unique corollary 
of the kind of scientific-industrial mode of life" it 
seems linked to our historical destiny "since any of 
the visible alternatives to it are unlikely to be com­
patible with it" [23]. Civil society has justified its 
own existence by its economic performance [24]. 
Here we have approached the core contradic­
tion of Gellner's argument. On the one hand, his 
civil society is an outcome of unique corollary of 
events (as indicated by the passages we have high­
lighted above). It has Western European historical 
roots and its preaching across cultural boundaries 
seems to be pointless [25]. He emphasises the im­
portance of cultural and social pre-conditions and a 
long-term historical development of certain "liber­
al" institutions and practices — such as 'industri­
alism', 'rational ethos' and 'homogenised 
culture' — and considers them functionally depen­
dent and inexplicably linked. On the other hand, he 
suggests that civil society is achievable in Eastern 
Europe through "positive endeavour" because of its 
"cultural proximity" to Western Europe [26]. 
'Following the pattern' of 'industrialisation' will 
ultimately homogenise the society and make it 
"rational". Paradoxically, ethnic cleansing appeared 
to work for the cause of civil society as soon as 
homogeneity is considered as its precondition. 
Many critical comments concerning Gellner's 
theory of nationalism seems relevant to his account 
of civil society [27]. Firstly, his model is rather 
abstract and a-historical. Gellner lays the stress on 
necessary and sufficient condition for the emer­
gence of civil society rather than on actual histori­
cal causation and historical facts. 
In particular, he implies that nation and state are 
congruent, which is a generalisation based on the 
West European model of nation-state. His admis­
sion of the fact that the major problem to the emer­
gence of civil society in Eastern Europe is the eth­
nic heterogeneity results from uncritical acceptance 
of this paradigm. 
In addition to that, Gellner's theory rests on cul­
tural and materialist premises, therefore, it appears 
to lack a sustained and developed sense of political. 
He assumes that there is a simple choice between 
nationalist homogenisation through assimilation, 
and nationalist secessionism that produces another 
nationalist homogenisation. In other words, he 
asserts that homogeneous nationalism is the most 
stable outcome desirable for the modern state. Yet, 
as the political practice of the contemporary world 
has proved, political integration of diverse people 
often occurs without full-scale cultural assimilation. 
More importantly modern political entities have 
also developed strategies for managing national and 
ethnic differences to counteract the potency of 
nationalist homogenisation. The key issue is that 
Gellner's theory too readily assumes that the gene­
ral case is, that the political nation and the cultural 
nation must be one and universal tendency. 
One more critical point stems from Gellner's 
underestimation of the role of power-politics in 
explaining which cultures become nations, and 
which nations create their own states. These 
processes even regarding Western Europe cannot be 
explained only in terms of material (industrial) 
transformation, without taking into account politi­
cal development — the creation of the modern state 
and European warfare. Gellner also ignores the role 
of the factors, other than economic one, in the gen­
esis and maintenance of civil society. Thereby he 
reduces civil society to a pragmatic economic prac­
tice and institutional arrangement and to rationali­
sation of the man's action resulting from the ratio­
nalisation of growth-oriented economic activity. 
However, the principal weakness of Gellner's 
story is that it links the analytical concept to a par-
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ticular historical reality and type of social system, 
that makes it hardly applicable as an analytical tool 
for the investigation of social phenomena outside 
this peculiar social reality. At the same time his 
account says little about civil society itself as par­
ticular form of social relations, because of its 
'Western' and 'functionalist' bias. For Gellner, civil 
society and its preconditions emerge in the course 
of the development of the modern, industrial socie­
ty that generates within itself the conditions in 
which it flourishes. Thereby, civil society becomes 
one more functional element of Western modernity, 
an 'export stamp' for assessing the degree of some 
society's fit within this model. 
Seemingly different approaches concerning the 
historical roots of the weakness, or failure of civil 
society to emerge, which in turn are interpreted as a 
pre-condition to the emergence of totalitarianism in 
East Central Europe, are taken by those scholars 
who employ a kind of longue duree cultural-his­
toric-geographic model. Its early variant emphasis­
es the continuity of development and "civilization-
al" difference [28] between Eastern and Western 
Europe, understood in terms of religious and cultur­
al traditions that resulted from the adoption of dif­
ferent version of Christianity — Western Roman or 
Eastern Orthodox — and dates back to the Early 
Middle Ages. The more elaborated versions empha­
sise the emergence of dissimilar social and legal 
structures, and consequently, political cultures. 
Probably the most influential proponent of this 
approach is a Hungarian historian Jeno Szucz 
whose work owes to some ideas of another Hun­
garian — sociologist and historian Istvan Bibo [29]. 
Szucz examines some aspects of the birth of mod­
ern civil societies and aims to clarify the extent to 
which the modern European division between soci­
ety and the state was conditioned by prior historical 
development, which varied geographically [30]. 
In Szticz's view, East Central Europe consti­
tutes a hybrid development, a combination of the 
features of the two other European regions — 
Western and Eastern. The latter (roughly embracing 
the European territories of the Russian empire — 
"between the Poles and the Urals") seceded from 
the European structure in the end of the Middle 
Ages and took shape under the influence of 
Bizantine "cezaropapist" state and religious tradi­
tions. The Western part of Europe was principally 
different. It was distinguished by "structural — and 
theoretical — separation of "society" from the 
"state", [31] and managed to develop, in Bibo's 
terms, a "democratic way of organising society", or, 
in Szilcz's view, civil society, the roots of which can 
be traced back as early as to Middle Ages. "Western 
feudalism" with political and social fragmentation 
of society based on private ownership of land, with 
fragmentation of sovereignty and contractual nature 
of vassalage, with respect for human dignity (which 
was also theorised by Church) and legal rights of 
the individual, with plurality and balancing nature 
of "small spheres of freedom" (one of which was 
autonomous city) — created favourable conditions 
for organisation of political functions "from below" 
that prevented a concentration of power and facili­
tated the birth of society as an autonomous entity 
[32]. 
Although Western absolutist state for a time 
subordinated society to itself, in practice it rather 
"administered freedom than annihilated it". Thus, 
various political autonomies and "freedoms" were 
not eliminated, and modern "national society" freed 
itself from absolutism considering itself a real 
source of sovereignty and then could control the 
state in practice [33]. 
Under the 'Eastern model', where absolutism 
developed earlier, lasted much longer and served as 
the fundamental framework for all subsequent 
developments, the nation was forged from imperial 
absolutism ("the absolutist state 'nationalised' soci­
ety"). In terms of its social character, it still re­
mained the society of subjects, "a social framework 
subordinated to the 'freedom of the state' " [34]. 
East Central Europe, lying between these two mod­
els "...crossed the threshold of modern times 
amidst newly developing 'Eastern European' con­
ditions, but with defective 'Western-like' struc­
tures". The attempt to preserve these medieval 
structures in the era of absolutism led older political 
nations in the region either to subordination to the 
empires (in the Polish case), to the "hybrid model" 
of absolutism (Prussia—Germany) or even the per­
sistence of the old empires, unable to cope with 
modern national demands (Habsburg monarchy) 
[35]. The state structures of East Central Europe 
were shaped by the strength of social power group­
ings, by the introduction of the so-called "second 
serfdom" and the preservation of a predominantly 
agrarian economy, and also by geopolitical 
factors — the impact of the waves of historical 
events pounding this area from the expansive 
neighbouring (Western and Eastern) regions and 
constant threat of invasion from Asia Minor [36]. 
George Sch6pflin's essay The Political Tradi­
tions of Eastern Europe [37] owes a great deal to 
Szucs's typology, while developing his main lines 
of argument beyond the nineteenth century. In 
Schopflin's view, Eastern Europe (which corre­
sponds to Szucs's East Central Europe), is located 
between "the Western tradition of the division of 
power and the Eastern tradition of concentration of 
power", and not only entered contemporary history 
with the power of its society weaker, and the power 
of the state generally stronger than in the West, but 
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also attempted to "Westernise" in the "backward 
mode". 
The weakness of the native institutions and 
political traditions (partly due to its earlier indige­
nous development and partly to foreign rule) as well 
as the weakness of central principles of reciprocity 
and autonomy of law, further reinforced the all-
empowerment of the state. The role of the latter as 
the initiator of a political-military-administrative 
modernisation based on Western models ensured its 
continued pre-eminence and discretional power in 
strategic fields of taxation and military organisa­
tion. Society was too weak to exercise control over 
these areas, whereby it could not sustain its autono­
my vis-a-vis the state [38]. 
For Schopflin, the attempt of Eastern European 
modemisers to replicate the Western European 
model was only formal and superficial. It could not 
appreciate "...the generations of development in 
values and attitudes" that lay behind Western polit­
ical development" [39] and the role of comparative­
ly strong autonomous spheres and centres of power, 
on which new modern political systems relying on 
civil society were based in the West. Their absence 
or weakness in the case of Eastern Europe, involved 
the state in contradiction of having to construct civil 
society from above, and in doing so favoured etatist 
solutions and bureaucratic management instead of 
entrepreneurial initiatives, participatory politics and 
a general redistribution of power. As a result, the 
rise of several East European states after the First 
World War was not accompanied by a significant 
development of autonomous civil society [40]. 
Among other factors contributing to the under­
development of Eastern Europe, Schopflin empha­
sises "a dearth of urbanisation", that entailed the 
lack of autonomous centres of political and eco­
nomic activity and social integration and also ham­
pered the development of a stable national bour­
geoisie. The noble origins of cultural, professional 
and political elites in some parts of the region ex­
plain, in Schopflin's view, their hostility to "mo­
dern" entrepreneurial ethos and its carriers — entre­
preneurial social groups, usually of "alien" ethnic 
origin. This hostility was one of the elements in the 
overlapping ethnonational and social fragmentation 
of society [41]. 
Schopflin's analysis of these social structures 
reinforce his general thesis that on the eve of the 
communist take-over East European societies, 
although undergoing "slow, halting modernisation" 
were yet incapable of achieving the level of politi­
cal maturity, self-organisation, and functional com­
plexity typical of Western Europe. He suggests that 
without Soviet presence they would have probably 
moved in the direction of greater pluralism and 
wider political participation, yet their political sys­
tems would have been more etatist, with a certain 
kind of collectivism and corporativism as a "near-
ineradicable component of reigning political ethos" 
[42]. 
Szixcz's and Schopflin's essays provide a cor­
rective to the somewhat superficial view of the dis­
tinctiveness of East Central or Central Europe based 
on primarily religious and cultural factors, and, by 
contrast with Gellner's view [43], pay more atten­
tion to specific features and continuity of social and 
political structures as favourable or unfavourable to 
the development of civil society. However, their 
accounts share with each other some considerable 
flaws. 
In the first place, none of the authors questions 
the validity or usefulness of the concept of the his­
torical region for their analysis. The unity of a cer­
tain area through time (and hence through change) is 
assumed rather than reflected upon. In the attempt to 
examine the distinctiveness of East Central Europe, 
Western European history is treated as having an 
obvious character and unity of its own while dispar­
ities characterising that area are ignored or passed 
over. The negative aspect of this perception of an 
idealised and generalised Western Europe, is that its 
example is used as a model and a yardstick against 
which the history of the rest of the geographical area 
of Europe is to be measured and assessed. In this 
approach, the distinctiveness of East Central Europe 
often amounts to a "lack of, or a "worse replica" of 
those features that apparently characterise the 
Western European model without exploration of 
their nature. Yet, whatever the historical explanation 
of an 'insufficiently Western development', the 
basic implication of the idea of an 'East Central 
Europe' is the region's proximity to, and inevitable 
connection of its future development, to following 
the 'real' European — Western 'option'. 
The analysis of the arguments presented above, 
suggests that attempts to synthesise the past and 
present in a master-narrative of civil society, even if 
offering some useful substantive generalisations, 
remain context insensitive and overlook substantial 
differences in its operation in specific historical set­
tings. They rather present more refined versions of 
theories of development and underdevelopment. 
A more context-sensitive studies of civil socie­
ty — at the level of associational culture within a 
particular community or, at maximum, a particular 
country, suggest that its proper understanding can 
be produced not by using the concept of civil soci­
ety as a simple pass/fail test, but rather by differen­
tiation between types and degrees of civil society, 
by historicising the quality of associational life and 
the extent of tolerance, pluralism, and self-regula­
tion at work within and between social groups and 
societies. For, as argues Frank Trentmann [44], 
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associations and civility can pull in different direc­
tions, and non-coercive voluntary social relations 
can take different forms. Therefore, there is a good 
reason to be sceptical of the conflation of civil soci­
ety with the "modern" and European path only, and 
with a particular social constituency (bourgeoisie or 
middle classes) and particular ideology (liberalism). 
All these arguments call for a "micro-scale" 
reconsideration and historical contextualisation of 
sociological and theoretical enquiries, and for a mo­
re informed dialogue between history and theory of 
civil society; for adding complexity to the some­
times abstract picture painted by some theorists, 
and suggesting new ways of looking at an old term. 
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О. В. Клименко 
ГРОМАДЯНСЬКЕ СУСПІЛЬСТВО У ЦЕНТРАЛЬНО-СХІДНІЙ ЄВРОПІ: 
МІЖ ТЕОРЕТИЧНИМ КОНЦЕПТОМ ТА ІСТОРИЧНИМ КОНТЕКСТОМ 
У статті проаналізовано роботи Ернста Геллнера, Єно Сюча та Джорджа Шопліна. Роз­
глядаючи громадянське суспільство не тільки як аналітичний концепт, але й як історичний 
феномен, ці дослідники намагаються з 'ясувати сутність громадянського суспільства, просте­
жуючи його виникнення й передумови в Західній Європі, і, застосувавши порівняльний аналіз — 
Кушніренко В.О. До проблеми реформування ісламської держави 245 
пояснити причини його «слабкості», «недорозвиненості» (або й навіть неможливість його 
виникнення) у Центрально-Східній Європі. Автор статті ставить під сумнів ефективність 
використання історико-географічного регіону як одиниці аналізу для розуміння феномену гро­
мадянського суспільства і висловлюється на користь більшої історичної контекстуалізації 
соціологічних та теоретичних досліджень, а також більш поінформованого діалогу між: 
історією та теорією громадянського суспільства. 
